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IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES:
INCOME FROM SEPARATE
PROPERTY UNDER DIVORCE
LAW AND UNDER
WISCONSIN'S MARITAL
PROPERTY ACT*
TIMOTHY A. BASCOM**
On January 1, 1986, the Wisconsin Marital Property Act
(the "Act") became effective.1 The interpretive notes which
accompanied the Act indicate that the legislature did not in-
tend the Act to conflict with current Wisconsin divorce law.2
However, a review of certain provisions of the Act reveals that
such is not the case. The following potential areas of conflict
have been identified and provide the subject matter for this
article:
1. Under the Act, either spouse may unilaterally execute
a written statement whereby that spouse declares that any in-
come from property other than marital property3 (e.g., prop-
erty which was received by gift or inheritance) shall retain its
* The author would like to thank Carrie A. Raymond for her valuable assistance in
the preparation of the article.
** Attorney with Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & Rieselbach, S.C.; B.A.,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1972; M.A., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
1978; S.D., Marquette University, 1982.
1. Wisconsin Marital Property Act, 1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 190 (codified at WIs.
STAT. ANN. §§ 766.001-.97 (West Supp. 1986).
2. Wisconsin Marital Property Act, 1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 149 explanatory note
(the legislative council staff prepared notes for the original 1985 Senate Bill 150 which
were retained in the enrolled bill as revised).
3. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.31 (West Supp. 1986) for the standards for classifica-
tion of property. With respect to income from nonmarital property § 766.31 provides:
(4) Except as provided under subs. (7)(a), (7p) and (10), income earned or ac-
crued by a spouse or attributable to property of a spouse during marriage and
after the determination date is marital property.
(7p) Income attributable to all or specified property other than marital property,
with respect to which a spouse has executed under s. 766.59 a statement unilater-
ally designating that income in his or her individual property, is individual
property.
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individual character.4 These unilateral statements are euphe-
mistically called Louisiana Fruits Statements.' The legisla-
ture's statement of intent notwithstanding, current Wisconsin
divorce law provides that the income from individual property
is part of the marital estate and thus subject to division upon
divorce.' There is, therefore, a conflict between the Act and
current divorce law which gives rise to the question of
whether the Louisiana Fruits Statement will prohibit the divi-
sion of the income from separate property at the time of di-
vorce or whether the Louisiana Fruits Statement simply
excludes the income from separate property from the marital
estate during the term of the marriage.
2. A second issue concerning the enforceability of Loui-
siana Fruits Statements relates to the classification of such
documents at the time of a divorce. If, for example, the trial
court determines that a Louisiana Fruits declaration is a
"Marital Property Agreement," the court may invalidate the
declaration if it has an adverse impact on the children of the
marriage.' Additionally, a question exists as to whether the
Louisiana Fruits declaration will prevent the trial court from
dividing separate assets under section 767.255 of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes upon a finding that the failure to do so will work a
hardship on the other spouse or the children of the marriage.8
Perhaps an even more interesting and complex issue is
whether the court will measure the "unconscionability" or
4. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.59(1) (West Supp. 1986) provides: "[a] spouse may uni-
laterally execute a written statement which classifies the income attributable to all or
certain of that spouse's property other than marital property as individual property."
5. The phrase "Louisiana Fruits" comes from the idea that the fruits of the "tree"
of separate property are a product of the tree, and therefore should be separate prop-
erty. See generally Furrh, A Survey of the 1985 Amendments to the Wisconsin Marital
Property Act, The Trailer Bill, 58 Wis. Bar Bull. 11, 14 (Dec. 1985).
6. WIs. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84); see also Arneson v. Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d 236,
355 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1984).
7. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.58(2) (West Supp. 1986) (eff. Jan. 1, 1986).
8. WIS. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84). Section 767.255 provides in relevant part:
Any property shown to have been acquired by either party prior to or during the
course of the marriage as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance or to have been
paid for by either party with funds so acquired shall remain the property of such
party and may not be subjected to a property division under this section except
upon a finding that refusal to divide such property will create a hardship on the
other party or on the children of the marriage, and in that event the court may
divest the party of such property in a fair and equitable manner.
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"inequitability" of the Louisiana Fruits declaration at the date
of execution or at the date of enforcement.9
The focus of this article is on the unresolved issues relating
to the enforceability of a Louisiana Fruits Statement under
Chapter 767 of the Wisconsin Statutes. In addition, this arti-
cle will study the issue of whether a court should apply the
standards set forth in Chapter 766 for marital property agree-
ments in the event of a divorce, or whether the standards set
forth in Chapter 767 should control.10
LOUISIANA FRUITS STATEMENTS
A. Property Protected by Unilateral Statements
Under section 766.59 of the Wisconsin Statutes, either
spouse may unilaterally execute a written statement which
classifies the income attributable to all or certain of that
spouse's nonmarital property as individual property." To be
effective, the statement must be signed and notarized and de-
livered to the other spouse within five days after signing.1 2
The failure to give the other spouse notice is a breach of duty
of good faith imposed by the Act. 13 Any income from the
property designated in the unilateral statement which accrues
on or after the date the statement becomes effective is individ-
ual property. From the effective date of the statement until
revocation, the unilateral statement excludes income attribu-
table to separate property including net rents, interest in divi-
dends from stock, trusts or other separate assets.1 4
9. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
10. A number of other issues have been identified as unique to the Marital Property
Act. For a discussion of these related issues, see Podell, Impact of Wisconsin's Marital
Property Act on Family Law, 68 MARQ. L. REv. 449 (1985); Schwartz, Agreements
Between Spouses Under the Wisconsin Marital Property Act, 68 MARQ. L. REv. 404(1985).
11. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.59(1) (West Supp. 1986).
12. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.59(2)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1986).
13. Under the Marital Property Act, each spouse has a duty of good faith with
respect to matters involving marital property or other property of the other spouse, and
this duty may not be altered by a marital property agreement. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 766.15(1) (West Supp. 1986).
14. The Legislative Council's Special Committee Supplemental Notes relating to
1985 Wis. Laws 37 provide: "income 'attributable to property' includes net rents, inter-
est and dividends from stock. Income 'attributable to property' should be distinguished
from other income, such as wages resulting from spousal labor." WISCONSIN STAT-
UTES AND OTHER MATERIALS RELATING TO MARITAL PROPERTY REFORM, app. VI,
1986]
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When analyzing the effect of a Louisiana Fruits unilateral
statement on the assets of the marital estate, one must remem-
ber that a distinction exists between the income from individ-
ual assets and the appreciation of individual assets during the
marriage. The appreciation of individual assets may become
marital property if the appreciation meets certain tests set
forth in section 766.63 of the Wisconsin Statutes."5 Where
one spouse applies substantial labor, effort, creativity or mana-
gerial activity to either spouse's nonmarital property, 16 the ap-
preciation of the nonmarital property which is attributed to
that spouse's activities becomes marital property if (1) the
spouse does not receive reasonable compensation for his or
her activity and (2) substantial appreciation of the property
results from that spouse's efforts. In the absence of a formal
marital property agreement, a unilateral Louisiana Fruits
Statement will not protect the substantially appreciated
nonmarital property which has appreciated due to the efforts
and activity of either spouse.
The Act's provision with respect to the appreciation of
nonmarital property is consistent with current divorce law in
Wisconsin. 17 In Plachta v. Plachta,8 the Wisconsin Court of
26 (ATS-CLE Division, The State Bar of Wisconsin ed. Supp. 1985) [hereinafter SuP-
PLEMENTAL NOTES]. Since the Supplemental Committee Notes were prepared after
the passage of the Act, they were not a part of the enacted legislation, and as such do
not have the same official status. However, because they were drafted by the same
committee that drafted the original Bill and Notes, they do express the intent of the
committee. Id. at 1.
15. Under Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.63 (West Supp. 1986), property is classified as
mixed if the nonmarital property is mixed with marital property. The appreciation at-
tributable to nonmarital assets becomes a marital asset if the factors of § 766.63(2) are
satisfied. Id.
16. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.63(2) (West Supp. 1986) provides:
Application by one spouse of substantial labor, effort, inventiveness, physical or
intellectual creativity or managerial activity to either spouses' property other
than marital property creates marital property attributable to that application if
both of the following apply:
(a) Reasonable compensation is not received for the application.
(b) Substantial appreciation of the property results from the application.
The comments to Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.63 (West Supp. 1986) note that the pool of
property to which the appreciation rule applies encompasses all property other than
marital property, and not just individual property.
17. It is interesting to note that under the Marital Property Act, the appreciation of
nonmarital property becomes marital property if such appreciation is due to the efforts
of either spouse. In a recent case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that although
appreciation due to the efforts of the nonowning spouse becomes marital property, the
[Vol. 70:41
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Appeals held that the appreciation of nonmarital property is
regarded as nonmarital property where the separate property
retains its character throughout the marriage and the appreci-
ation of the nonmarital property was due to general economic
conditions rather than to one spouse's efforts. 19 Since the ap-
preciation was not the result of one spouse's efforts, the court
found that the failure to divide the separate property would
not work a "hardship" on the nonowning spouse pursuant to
section 767.255.20 Therefore, the court concluded that the ap-
preciated separate property retained its separate identity.21
Since the appreciation of separate property which is due to the
efforts of a spouse is marital property and cannot be divided
except by a marital settlement agreement on order of the
court, a Louisana Fruits Statement will be ineffectual to shield
these assets from division upon divorce.
The Act is clear, however, that a Louisiana Fruits State-
ment is treated as if it were a marital property agreement with
respect to third parties.22 As such, a spouse seeking to protect
the income from his or her separate property must treat the
Louisiana Fruits Statement as if it were a marital property
agreement and notify creditors and other third parties of the
existence of the unilateral statement as required by the Act.
Unless a third-party creditor has knowledge of the unilateral
statement, the creditor will be able to reach the income from
the separate property as if it were marital property.23
courts have yet to pass on whether the appreciation of separate property due to the
efforts of the owning spouse become part of the marital estate. See Wierman v. Wier-
man, 130 Wis. 2d 425, 440, 387 N.W.2d 744, 750 (1986). The rationale behind
§ 766.63, as well as the current divorce law, is simple: where the appreciation of the
property is due to the efforts of one spouse, the appreciation is more akin to income
resulting from labor for which the spouse applying the labor should be compensated.
Since the "income" attributable to a spouse's efforts becomes part of the marital estate,
the appreciation of separate property which is due to the efforts of either spouse should
also become property of the marital estate. As such, it is probable that courts will find
that the appreciation of separate property which is due to the efforts of either spouse is
part of the marital estate at the time of the divorce.
18. 118 Wis. 2d 329, 348 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1984).
19. Id. at 333, 348 N.W.2d at 195.
20. Id. at 334, 348 N.W.2d at 195-96.
21. Id.
22. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.59(5) (West Supp. 1986).
23. The requirement that parties deliver the Louisiana Fruit Statement to creditors
is different than the requirements under Louisiana law. In Louisiana, all the party must
do is file the unilateral statement with the Register of Deeds in the parish in which the
1986]
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B. Enforceability
Having determined the scope of a unilateral Louisiana
Fruits Statement, we must next address whether Chapter 766
and/or Chapter 767 of the Wisconsin Statutes will govern a
division of the income from separate property upon the disso-
lution of the marriage. On the one hand, Chapter 767 pro-
vides that the "fruits" of separate property are considered part
of the marital estate and, thus, subject to division upon di-
vorce.24 Since these fruits are considered part of the marital
estate, the parties can only divide them by entering into an
agreement signed by both parties. On the other hand, under
Chapter 766 a spouse may unilaterally elect to exclude the
fruits of separate property from the marital estate during the
26heiseiwhte aterm of the parties' marriage. Thus, the issue is whether a
unilateral Louisiana Fruits Statement will bind both parties,
as well as a trial court, upon the dissolution of the marriage.
The answer to this question may turn upon decisions of
the Louisiana state courts. This is because the committee
notes to section 766.59 specifically state that section 766.59
couple resides. Upon such a filing, all third parties are deemed to be put on notice that
the income attributable to that spouse's property is no longer subject to a creditor's
rights. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2339 (West Supp. 1986); see infra note 28 for text
of art. 2339. Although the Wisconsin provision requiring actual delivery is somewhat
more onerous, it is in keeping with the legislative determination that a creditor is enti-
tled to reach all assets that could be classified as marital assets unless that creditor is put
on actual notice that certain property has been excluded from the marital estate by the
parties. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(4m) (West Supp. 1986).
24. The rationale for including the income in the marital estate is that the "income
generated from the asset [is] separate and distinct from the asset itself." Arneson v.
Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d 236, 244, 355 N.W.2d 16, 20 (1984). But see also Wierman v.
Wierman, 130 Wis. 2d 425, 440, 387 N.W.2d 744, 750 (1986) (court distinguished in-
come generated through the efforts of the marital partnership from income attributable
to a source independent of the marriage).
25. Wisconsin Marital Property Act, 1985 Wis. Laws 29, § 2353 (codified at Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 767.10 (West Supp. 1986)).
26. The unilateral nature of the Louisiana Fruits Statement raises yet another ap-
parent conflict with current divorce practice. While it is true that parties to the mar-
riage can bilaterally agree to the division of the entire marital estate, prior to such
agreement in a divorce action, both parties must disclose all assets, held either sepa-
rately or jointly. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.27(1) (1983-84). This disclosure require-
ment is true whether the parties enter into a marital agreement at divorce or during the
term of their marriage. See Schumacher v. Schumacher, 131 Wis. 2d 332, 388 N.W.2d
912 (1986). However, absolutely no disclosure must be made prior to the execution of a
unilateral Louisiana Fruits Statement.
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was based upon a comparable provision of Louisiana law.27
This section, in a somewhat different form than section
766.59, states that the fruits derived from either spouses' sepa-
rate property is community property unless expressly reserved
by that spouse in a written declaration which is notarized and
filed in the parish in which the parties reside.2 8 Prior to Janu-
ary, 1980, the effective date of Louisiana's current community
property laws, Louisiana law contained a similar provision
which allowed only the wife to preserve the separate character
of the income of her assets by executing a similar document.29
Under Louisiana case law, it is fairly apparent that Louisi-
ana courts would honor the wife's unilateral statement upon
divorce. For example, in both Mathews v. Hansberry30 and
Reynolds v. Reynolds,3 1 a husband or former husband sought
to obtain a portion of the income his wife had realized from
certain separate property. In each case, the court noted that
all property which comes into the marital community is pre-
sumed to be marital property, unless shown to the contrary.
In both cases the wife failed to file the unilateral statement
under Louisiana law. Each court stated that had she done so,
she could have shielded the income derived from her separate
assets from division. Having failed to do so, the husband was
entitled to one-half of the income from the wife's separate
property. 3
2
27. See SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES, supra note 14, at 26.
28. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.59 (West Supp. 1986) with LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 2339 (West. 1985) (eft. Jan. 1, 1980), which similarly provides:
The natural and civil fruits of the separate property of a spouse, minerals
produced from or attributable to a separate asset, and bonuses, delay rentals,
royalties, and shut-in payments arising from mineral leases are community prop-
erty. Nevertheless, a spouse may reserve them as his separate property by a
declaration made in an authentic act or in an act under private signature duly
acknowledged.
As to the fruits and revenues of immovables, the declaration is effective when
filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable
property is located. As to fruits of movables, the declaration is effective when
filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the declarant is
domiciled.
29. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2386 (West 1944) (repealed 1979). Interestingly
enough, the wife was also able to unilaterally exclude the fruits of her labor (i.e., her
wages) from the marital estate. Id.
30. 71 So. 2d 232 (La. Ct. App. 1954).
31. 365 So. 2d 530 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
32. Id. at 537; Mathews, 71 So. 2d at 235.
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Should Wisconsin courts follow Louisiana law, they would
have to conclude that the income from separate property is no
longer subject to division once a spouse has executed a Louisi-
ana Fruits Statement. The rationale for such a finding is
rather simple. Prior to the enactment of the Marital Property
Act, Wisconsin law provided that gifted or inherited property
was considered individual property33 while the income from
that property was treated no differently than income from any
other source.34 Since all income generated by an asset was
viewed as separate and distinct from the asset itself, income
from individual assets was found to be part of the marital es-
tate.35 With the advent of Chapter 766, the legislature has
provided married couples with an option concerning the in-
come from individual property. Either spouse may elect to
treat the income from such property as individual property.
In the event such an election is made, the individual property
never becomes part of the marital estate. Since the individual
property and its income were never part of the marital estate,
a trial court may have no authority to divide it as it would a
marital asset.36
However, it is not likely that Wisconsin's courts will fol-
low Louisiana precedent. As will be more fully discussed be-
low, agreements which exclude certain assets from the marital
estate are examined quite critically by Wisconsin's courts and
are subject to attack on a number of grounds.37 Additionally,
since the legislature expressly stated that it did not intend the
Marital Property Act to affect Wisconsin divorce law, courts
could easily conclude that the Louisiana Fruits Statement
only excludes income from separate property from the marital
estate during the term of marriage. Thus, while such a state-
ment may keep creditors from the income during a marriage,
33. See Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84).
34. Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d 236, 355 N.W.2d 16.
35. Id. at 244, 355 N.W.2d at 20.
36. It is interesting to note that other states have also treated the income from
separate property as marital property. For example, IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (1983) pro-
vides that all property which is not individual property is treated as marital property.
In fact, all income from separate property is treated as marital property unless both
parties agree in writing that the property is to be excluded from the marital community.
Id. This section seems to be much more in keeping with current Wisconsin divorce law
than is Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.59 (West Supp. 1986).
37. WIs. STAT. § 766.58(6) (1983-84) (eff. Jan. 1, 1986).
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the income (or what has been purchased with the income)
may nonetheless be divided upon divorce.
C. Marital Property Agreements
One possible alternative approach a court may choose to
take when faced with the issue of the enforceability of a Loui-
siana Fruits Statement upon divorce is to classify the state-
ment as a Marital Property Agreement. If a court classifies
the unilateral statement as a Marital Property Agreement, it is
then subject to attack on the grounds that it has an adverse
impact on the children of the marriage38 or that it was uncon-
scionable when made and therefore, not binding.39
Although Chapter 766 of the Wisconsin Statutes does not
expressly address this issue, it is unlikely that the drafters in-
tended a unilateral statement to be classified as a marital prop-
erty agreement. The drafters set forth highly detailed
requirements for marital property agreements in the Marital
Property Act. For example, a marital property agreement is
not enforceable if a spouse proves the absence of fair and rea-
sonable disclosure of the other's assets40 or that the spouse did
not execute the agreement voluntarily.4 1 Since a unilateral
statement contains almost none of the requirements set forth
in section 766.58, the drafters most likely did not intend such
statements to be classified as marital property agreements.
Moreover, the drafters expressly stated that a unilateral
statement was to be treated as if it were a marital property
agreement with respect to third-party creditors, 42 thus, high-
lighting the distinction between a marital property agreement
and a unilateral statement which is defined only as a "written
statement. '43 As such, it is unlikely that the legislature in-
tended the unilateral written statement to function as a mari-
tal property agreement for all purposes.
38. WIs. STAT. § 766.58(2) (1983-84) (efi. Jan. 1, 1986).
39. Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6)(a) (1983-84) (eff. Jan. 1, 1986).
40. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.58(6)(c) (West Supp. 1986) (ef. Jan. 1, 1986).
41. Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6)(b) (1983-84) (eff. Jan. 1, 1986).
42. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.59(5) (West Supp. 1986) (elf. Jan. 1, 1986).
43. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.59(1) (,Vest Supp. 1986) ("[a] spouse may
unilaterally execute a written statement") with § 766.59(5) ("[w]ith respect to its effect
on third parties, a statement or a revocation shall be treated as if it were a marital
property agreement").
1986]
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That is not to say that a court will never look behind a
Louisiana Fruits Statement and reach the separate assets of
the spouse through another means. When analyzing the ex-
tent to which separate property should be included or ex-
cluded from a marital estate upon divorce, Wisconsin courts
are guided by section 767.255 which states that individual
property is not subject to property division under this section
"except upon a finding that refusal to divide such property
will create a hardship on the other party." 44 Thus, the court
could apply section 767.255 and find that depriving the non-
titled spouse from the income of the other spouse's separate
property works a hardship on the nontitled spouse.45 Espe-
cially in light of the unilateral nature of the Louisiana Fruits
Statement, as opposed to a bilateral marital property agree-
ment, the finding of hardship may be an easy way of applying
Wisconsin divorce law rather than the provisions of the Mari-
tal Property Act.
Several recent Wisconsin Supreme Court cases relating to
the enforceability of prenuptial agreements may have an im-
pact on a court's analysis of a Louisiana Fruits Statement as
well. In Levy v. Levy, 46 the parties entered into a premarital
agreement whereby the parties set forth their respective rights
to each other's property "both during the term of such mar-
riage and upon the termination thereof by the death of one or
both of the parties."47 After the wife filed for divorce, the hus-
band sought to restrict his wife's right to marital assets by
arguing that the prenuptial agreement was effective to limit
her rights not only upon her husband's death, but also upon
termination of the marriage by divorce. The trial court
agreed, finding that the prenuptial agreement was equitable,
enforceable and applicable to termination of the marriage by
divorce as well as death.48
44. Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84).
45. By applying the "hardship" standard, Wisconsin courts have concluded that
the appreciation of separate property which is due to the efforts of the nonowning
spouse is subject to division upon divorce. The failure to so divide such property would
work a "hardship" on the nonowning, contributing spouse. Plachta v. Plachta, 118 Wis.
2d 329, 334, 348 N.W.2d 193, 195-96 (Ct. App. 1984).
46. 130 Wis. 2d 523, 388 N.W.2d 170 (1986).
47. Id. at 527 n.2, 388 N.W.2d at 172 n.2.
48. The trial court reasoned that the agreement was entered into with valid family
considerations in mind and that the parties did not refer to divorce because of public
[Vol. 70:41
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On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. Ap-
plying basic rules of contract construction the court noted
that the parties' premarital agreement never mentioned the
words "divorce" or "separation." 49 Additionally, both parties
testified at trial that neither contemplated divorce when exe-
cuting the premarital agreement. ° Since the testimony of the
parties and the language of the agreement itself left no ques-
tion that the premarital agreement was intended to apply only
upon death, and not at divorce, the supreme court remanded
the case for recomputation of property division under section
767.255 of the Wisconsin Statutes." l
The Levy decision impacts the enforceability of the Louisi-
ana Fruits Statement in a number of ways. Initially, one can-
not help but note that the courts strictly construed the Levys'
premarital agreement to apply only upon the death of either
or both of the parties. This narrow construction reveals that
the court continues to view agreements which dispose of mari-
tal assets in an unequal fashion as suspect under the law.5 2
Since a Louisiana Fruits Statement is unilateral in nature, and
disposes of property which the courts previously considered
marital assets, it is likely that these unilateral statements will
also be strictly construed.
policy considerations at the time they entered into the agreement. Id. at 531, 388
N.W.2d at 179. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Levy v. Levy,
No. 84-1425 (Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1985), rev'd, 130 Wis. 2d 523, 388 N.W.2d 170 (1986).
49. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the trial court's reference to the public
policy provisions against premarital agreements. The court noted that the cases upon
which the trial judge relied allowed such agreements to "be considered" but stated that
neither case supported the proposition that antenuptial agreements relating only to
death furnished a basis for making a property division upon divorce. Levy, 130 Wis. 2d
at 533 n.4, 388 N.W.2d at 174 n.4.
50. Id. at 534-35, 388 N.W.2d at 175.
51. In finding that the agreement was binding upon divorce as well as upon death,
the trial court found that since a spouse could apparently recover 50% of the other
spouse's estate upon divorce, the application of § 767.255 would promote others to
"commence divorce actions rather than await the death of their spouses." Id. at 533,
388 N.W.2d at 174. The supreme court expressly rejected this rationale on the grounds
that a trial court has broad latitude to divide the marital estate under § 767.255, and
that a trial court could divide the marital estate along the same lines as set forth in the
prenuptial or antenuptial agreement, if it felt that it was equitable to do so. Id. at 532,
388 N.W.2d at 173.
52. Although courts may give lip service to the provisions of Wis. STAT.
§ 767.255(11) that agreements are presumed to be equitable, the recent trend apparent
in the court's decision in Levy seems to indicate a return to prior law which viewed such
agreements as suspect. See also infra note 53.
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Another case relating to the enforceability of prenuptial
and antenuptial agreements bears noting. In Button v. But-
ton,53 the Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced with the issue
of "when is equitableness of an antenuptial or postnuptial
agreement [under subsection 767.255(1 1)]54 to be determined
- as of the time of execution of the agreement or as of the
time of divorce?" 55 The court also addressed the issue of what
constituted an equitable agreement.
The Button court concluded that an agreement is inequita-
ble under section 767.255(11) if (1) either spouse failed to
make a fair and reasonable disclosure of their financial status;
(2) either spouse entered into the agreement involuntarily; or
(3) the substantive provisions of the agreement dividing the
property upon divorce were unfair to either spouse.5 6 The first
two requirements must be assessed as of the time of the execu-
tion of the agreement. 7 The third requirement is also to be
assessed as of the time of the execution of the agreement; how-
ever, if circumstances significantly change after the agreement
is signed, it must additionally be assessed as of the divorce.5 8
Obviously, in light of the unilateral nature of the Louisi-
ana Fruits Statement, the rules set forth in Button cannot be
53. 131 Wis. 2d 84, 388 N.W.2d 546 (1986).
54. Wis. STAT. § 767.255(11) (1983-84) provides:
Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage con-
cerning any arrangement for property distribution; such agreements shall be
binding upon the court except that no such agreement shall be binding where the
terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party. The court shall pre-
sume any such agreement to be equitable as to both parties.
As noted by the court in Button, § 767.255(11) fails to specify the time at which the
inequitable nature of the agreement is to be determined. 131 Wis. 2d at 98 n.3, 388
N.W.2d at 551 n.3.
55. Id. at 89, 388 N.W.2d at 548. On the same day that the court decided Button,
the court also issued a decision in Schumacher v. Schumacher, 131 Wis. 2d 332, 388
N.W.2d 912 (1986). The court followed the standards set forth in Button and affirmed
the trial court's decision setting aside an antenuptial agreement based on the fact that
the parties did not make a full and fair disclosure of their assets prior to entering into
the agreement. Although Mrs. Schumacher may have had a general knowledge of Mr.
Schumacher's holdings, actual knowledge of the other party's assets is required under
Button. Id. at 340, 388 N.W.2d at 915.
56. Button, 131 Wis. 2d at 89, 388 N.W.2d at 548.
57. Id.
58. Id.; cf Hengel v. Hengel, 122 Wis. 2d 737, 745, 365 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Ct. App.
1985), discussed in Button, 131 Wis. 2d at 98 n.3, 388 N.W.2d at 551-52 n.3 ("[n]either
party argues that equitability should be determined as of the time the agreement is
enforced").
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mechanically applied to determine whether a Louisiana Fruits
Statement will bind a court in a divorce action. However, this
case can provide guidance. Initially, one can again see the
critical eye with which courts examine agreements which pre-
clude an equitable distribution of marital assets.5 9 Since
courts so critically examine these agreements, especially
where only one party is represented by counsel, it is obvious
that unrelated Louisiana Fruits Statements will also be subject
to very close scrutiny.
Perhaps even more importantly, Button will provide a
yardstick whereby the trial court may measure the equitability
of a Louisiana Fruits Statement in determining whether to
reach the parties' separate assets under section 767.255. As
noted above, section 767.255 gives the court the power to
reach and divide separate assets "upon a finding'that refusal
to divide such property will create a hardship on the other
party or on the children of the marriage. ' 60 Upon such a find-
ing, the trial court has the authority to divide separate prop-
erty in a fair and equitable manner.
Although a court need not find the Louisiana Fruits State-
ment to be inequitable before it can reach separate property
under section 767.255, it stands to reason that the more oner-
ous and one-sided a document is, the more such a document
works a hardship on one party to the marriage. Since a party
may now unilaterally exclude from the marital estate property
which formerly was considered part of the marital estate,
courts may more readily find that the failure to reach such
59. It is interesting to note that the courts subject these agreements to great scru-
tiny even in light of the mandate of Wis. STAT. § 767.255(11) (1983-84) which states
that the court is to presume marital agreements are equitable. As noted in Button, while
the legislature has recognized that prenuptial and antenuptial agreements serve useful
functions in that they allow parties to structure their financial affairs to suit their needs,
§ 767.255(11) sets forth a competing public policy, i.e., marriage is a legal status in
which the state has a special interest. Specifically the court stated:
Certain rights and obligations dictated by the state flow from marriage, and the
legislature requires a divorce court to scrutinize an agreement between the
spouses carefully. The parties are free to contract, but they contract in the
shadow of the court's obligation to review the agreement on divorce to protect
the spouses' financial interests on divorce.
Button, 131 Wis. 2d at 94, 388 N.W.2d at 550. It is clear that the courts will look at
these "competing interests" and continue to closely scrutinize both prenuptial and ante-
nuptial agreements.
60. Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84).
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property will create a hardship and thereby circumvent the
provisions of section 766.59 and reach the fruits of separate
property.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, even though the legislature never intended
Chapter 766 to conflict with present Wisconsin divorce law,
such a conflict does exist. In light of the unilateral nature of
Louisiana Fruits Statements, it is likely that these statements
will be subject to close scrutiny in the Wisconsin courts. This
scrutiny may result in a finding that Louisiana Fruits State-
ments are ineffective to bar the division of the income of sepa-
rate assets upon the dissolution of a marriage.
